This paper examines the impact of the R&D fiscal incentive program on R&D by Dutch firms. Taking a factor-demand approach we measure the elasticity of firm R&D capital accumulation to its user cost. Econometric models are estimated using a rich unbalanced panel of firm data covering the period 1996-2004 with firm-specific R&D user costs varying with tax incentives. Using the estimated user cost elasticity, we perform a cost-benefit analysis of the R&D incentive program. We find some evidence of additionality suggesting that the level-based program of R&D incentives in the Netherlands is effective in stimulating firms' investment in R&D. However, the hypothesis of crowding out can be rejected only for small firms. The analysis also indicates that the level-based nature of the fiscal incentive scheme leads to a substantial social dead-weight loss.
Introduction
Many governments rely on fiscal incentives to lower the user cost of R&D and thereby stimulate business investment in research and development. The market failures due to R&D externalities and asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers for the financing of R&D projects are often cited to justify the existence of such government programs, which often involve substantial budgets (OECD, 2007) . The effectiveness of R&D fiscal incentives programs, however, continues to be the object of intense debate among economists.
We know from economic theory that investment in R&D can be modeled in the same way as investment in physical capital, and that therefore the user cost of R&D is a primary determinant of a firm's decision to invest in research and development. The elasticity of R&D with respect to its price is the main parameter of interest when assessing the effectiveness of such programs. Few studies have estimated this elasticity on firm-level data.
1 Notable exceptions are early contributions by Hall (1993) on the effectiveness of US Research and Experimental Credit; Bernstein (1986) on R&D support program in Canada and a more recent study by Mairesse and Mulkay (2004) on French data.
In this paper we take a fresh look at the sensitivity of the R&D capital accumulation to the user cost and assess the additionality of the R&D tax incentive program, such as the WBSO Act 2 . The focus of previous received contributions was primarily on estimating precisely the magnitude of the elasticity of R&D to its price. The emphasis in this paper is on the costbenefit trade-off of the government support of R&D. Fiscal programs, especially when they are level-based, are costly and in contrast to the previous literature that merely acknowledged the possibility of some significant waste from the social planner perspective (e.g. Russo,
2004), we actually attempt to quantify the magnitude of the dead-weight-loss due to present and future R&D and tax receipts forgone.
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The model considers each firm's demand for R&D capital, among other things, as a negative function of its price (user cost). Government lowers the price of R&D by implementing tax deductions on R&D labor, which triggers a partial adjustment process to a higher desired R&D stock. Our dynamic factor demand model accounts for this partial adjustment mechanism and is based on a CES technology (cf. Chirinko, Fazzari, Meyer, 1999; Mairesse and Mulkay, 2004; Hall and van Reenen, 2000) . We estimate the model using a firm-level unbalanced panel dataset covering 1996-2004, constructed from the annual R&D surveys, production statistics from the Central Bureau of Statistics and R&D tax incentives data. The richness of the merged dataset allows us to construct R&D price indexes and year-as well as firm-specific R&D user costs as a function of R&D tax incentives. Our firm-specific data allow a good measurement of the user cost by providing sufficient variation in the indexes in both the cross-section and time dimensions to improve the estimation of the effects of the R&D fiscal incentives program. To account for the endogeneity of the user cost of R&D we apply a generalized instrumental variables method to estimate a significant short-run elasticity of -0.4 and a long-run elasticity of -0.8 of firm R&D capital formation to its user cost.
We apply the estimated user cost elasticity of R&D capital stock to assess the effectiveness of the fiscal incentives program by comparing the additional R&D spurred by the fiscal incentives program to the cost for the government of supporting the R&D with the tax scheme. Our measure of the so-called bang-for the-buck differs from the measures adopted in most other papers (Czarnitzki et al., 2007; Parsons and Phillips, 2007) in that we compare the costs and benefits incurred until the firm reaches a new steady state in its R&D capital stock.
When the adjustment to the new optimal stock is spread out over time, it is appropriate to compare the costs and benefits in a dynamic perspective allowing for a rate of time preference.
We find evidence that the program of R&D incentives in the Netherlands has been effective in stimulating firms' investment in R&D. However, the hypothesis of crowding out can be rejected only for small firms. The results of our simulations also indicate that the level-based nature of the fiscal incentive scheme leads to the government supporting R&D which firms would do even without the tax incentives, resulting in a substantial deadweight loss (as much as 85% of the total revenue loss) from the social planner's perspective.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out our modeling approach.
Section 3 describes the way we have assembled our data set and explains how we have constructed the variables used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 presents our empirical results. We discuss several regression specifications, leading to our preferred specification.
We also discuss a number of alternative specifications and the robustness checks that we have performed. In section 5 we measure the effectiveness of the tax credits in stimulating R&D in the Netherlands. Section 6 concludes.
Empirical model
We derive a modeling framework that allows estimating the elasticity of firm R&D capital accumulation to its user cost. We start from a CES approximation to the true production function for firm i at time t (following Chirinko et al., 1999; Hall and van Reenen, 2000; Mairesse and Mulkay, 2004) :
where t i Q , is the output, t i K , is the end-of-period R&D stock, t i X , represents the other inputs, and γ (a scale factor), β (the distribution parameter), and ν (a measure of the returns to scale) are parameters to be estimated that characterize the technology, as well as ρ that enters the expression for the elasticity of substitution (σ ) between the R&D stock and the other inputs and is given by . 0 ) 1 /( 1 ≥ + = ρ σ If we assume that the R&D stock becomes immediately productive and there are no adjustment costs or other sources of lagged adjustment, and static expectations on prices and output, we obtain the first-order condition of the profit maximization, stating that the marginal product of R&D must equal the user cost of R&D R t i U , divided by the output price of the firm
Solving this equation for the optimal long-term R&D stock yields:
where A is a constant and )
. The exponent of output is equal to 1 if returns to scale are constant or if the elasticity of substitution is equal to 1 (a Cobb-Douglas technology). Equation (3) expresses the optimal demand for R&D capital in terms of its price (the user cost) relative to the price of output, and the volume of output. By taking the logarithm of both sides of (3) and denoting the log of variables by small letters we obtain:
The volume of output and the output price are difficult to measure at the micro level. What is generally done is to use industry-level prices. To eliminate the need to observe individual output prices, we introduce an output demand equation with constant price elasticity, so as to obtain a formulation involving nominal output, following the example of Klette and Griliches (1996) . We assume that the enterprise faces a demand curve given by
where t I Q , is the industry demand and t I P , the industry price in period t , and ε is the price elasticity in absolute value ( 0 > ε ). If we invert the demand function (5) we can write
The resulting industry-price deflated output is
and the demand function can also be written as If, after taking logs, we plug (6) and (7) into (4), we get
where
, and
The resulting expression gives the steady-state relationship (in logarithms) between a firm's optimal R&D stock, its real output, its user cost relative to the industry price, and the industry output 3 .
Equation (8) derived from an inter-temporal optimization problem depends then on the assumptions made regarding the adjustment cost function, the "time to build", and the process underlying the expectation formations. Such structural models are theoretically appealing but practically not very rewarding. To quote Hall and van Reenen (2000, p. 460) "Structural investment models for physical capital had a poor record of success in empirical testing whether of q-models,
Euler equations or Abel-Blanchard variety. Although various attempts have been made to estimate these more structural forms none have been conspicuously successful." An alternative, more flexible, strategy is to start from a more ad hoc dynamic formulation or to let the data reveal the dynamic formulation without specifying the essence of the dynamics.
To introduce a parsimonious specification that allows distinguishing between short-term and long-term effects of the user cost of R&D and indirectly of tax credits on R&D, several 3 The industry output disappears from equation (8) 
We approximate the discrete growth rate in the R&D stock by a log difference and assume that the growth rate in the R&D stock follows a partial adjustment mechanism, which could be formalized by an adjustment cost model (Chirinko et al., 1999; Nadiri and Rosen, 1969) ,
Equation (10) 
Changes in the R&D stock are therefore expressed as a weighted sum of the changes in the desired R&D stocks in the past. Equation (9) can then be rewritten as Equation (12) can be simplified as
The short-run elasticity of R&D stock with respect to the user cost of R&D is given by σλ − .
The long-run elasticity is given by σ − .
A third approach would be to assume an autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) specification for the R&D stock and to express the resulting equation in an error-correction (EC) form. This model has been adopted by Jaumotte and Pain (2005) and Mairesse and Mulkay (2004) .
Instead of equation (8) we have
α is the individual effect and and it η the idiosyncratic random effect. After rewriting (14) and combining it with (9) an ECM(1, 1) specification is obtained: . This specification presents a somewhat more flexible adjustment mechanism at the price of three additional parameters to be estimated. It has also the advantage compared to (14) to include regressors in levels instead of only first differences.
To the extent that these variables are persistent, taking first differences magnifies their noise component and thereby the errors in variable problem and the weak instrument problem. We shall nevertheless estimate all three specifications to check the robustness of our estimates.
Data and descriptive statistics

Data sample
The empirical analysis makes use of the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistic's annual CIS and R&D surveys in combination with production statistics. The R&D surveys contain information on firms' R&D expenditures and their breakdown by type, and the production statistics database contains information on output, employment and output deflators. These data sources and the process of merging them are explained in detail in Lokshin and Mohnen (2007b After cleaning the data, we are left with the following distribution of our sample across size classes. 5 The middle size group (50 to 200 employees) represents around 59% of the total number of firms. The largest firms (over 200 employees) are somewhat over-represented in our sample. The smallest size group (fewer than 10 employees) is under-represented due to the absence of innovation and R&D survey data from CBS over the whole period for firms with less than 10 employees. In the end, firms in our dataset account on average, across all years, for 15% of total WBSO expenditures and almost 25% of all R&D performed in the Netherlands.
Variables
The dependent variable in specifications (13) and (15) is the firm real R&D expenditures t i R , divided by its R&D stock in the previous period 1 , − t i K . The main explanatory variables are the user cost of R&D, value added and the industry output, in first differences in (13) and in 5 We selected only those firms that perform R&D on a continuous basis, the so-called continuous R&D performers, because in odd years CBS only collects data for continuous R&D performers. We also selected only those firms that have a positive R&D in the mentioned data sources. The use of lags in the dynamic econometric specification as well as the construction of R&D stock further eliminates firms with non-contiguous observations over time.
first differences and in levels in (15). We used the Fisher test as developed by Maddala and Wu (1999) to check the stationarity of variables. The null hypothesis of unit root is rejected for each of the variables. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on the variables used in the estimation.
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
As explained in the modeling section, a negative relation is expected between the user cost and the firm's R&D investment and a positive relationship between output and the R&D investment rate. To construct the user cost of R&D, we use the information about the R&D cost composition, provided by CBS. The construction of the user cost is explained in detail in appendix A. Table 3 shows the average user cost of R&D constructed using expression A2 in appendix A and its components for all the firms in our sample.
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
For identification purposes it is important that there be sufficient variation in
indicates that variation in the time dimension comes from two sources. First, there were a number of changes (taken to be exogenous) in the fiscal incentives scheme's parameters. Such changes, reported in Table 1 , occurred in every year except one within our estimation sample period. The first bracket threshold increased three times, the rate applied to the first bracket increased three times, the rate applied to the second bracket changed five times and the ceiling changed twice. The second source of variation in R i u in the time dimension comes from the changes in the macro variables such as the interest rate and the corporate income tax rate. The latter was gradually reduced from a high 37% in 1996 to 29% in 2004. Variation of R i u in the cross-section comes from two sources. First, the variation is determined by whether a firm applies the standard or the preferential starter's rate. Second, the level of tax credit depends on the remittance rate that in turn depends on how high a firm's R&D wage bill is. The ensuing endogeneity of the user cost calls for good instruments. We discuss how we address the endogeneity issue in the estimation section below.
The user cost in the absence of R&D tax incentives increased by 26% between 1997 and 2004. The average WBSO tax credit increased from 17.3 to 19.4 percent. This slight increase is attributable mostly to increases in the two scheme's ceilings and a resulting compositional change of the firms with respect to the WBSO scheme: (i) an increase of the percentage of firms applying for tax credits from 66.4% to 73.4% , (ii) an increase from 12.8% to 36.3% in the percentage of non-starter R&D performers that fall under the first bracket ceiling, and (iii) an increase from 16.5% to 36.6% in the percentage of non-starter R&D performers that fall between the first bracket and the second bracket ceiling. Column (3) in Table 3 
Econometric Results
The main results are reported in Table 4 . The results from estimating a dynamic version of equation (8), the ECM(1,1) specification (15) and the geometrically lagged distribution partial adjustment model (13) are presented in columns (1) - (3) of Table 4 , respectively.
Because of the simultaneity between the user cost and the amount of R&D we have to instrument for the level or the change in the user cost of R&D in each specification. It is also reasonable to consider that the output of the firm is endogenous and needs to be instrumented.
To follow Bloom at al. (2002) as closely as possible we estimate (8) using the within estimator instrumenting for the level of the real user cost of R&D, the level of output and the lagged dependent variable because of the presence of the individual effect. We use the following instruments: two-and three-period lagged levels of the R&D stock, the lagged level of real output, and the length of the first and second brackets of the WBSO tax incentive scheme (see appendix A), as well as the contemporaneous real R&D deflator, which varies at the sectoral level. The fiscal incentives scheme's parameters are valid instruments because they are exogenous policy decisions and yet reasonably correlated with the firm's user cost. we cannot reject the exogeneity of contemporaneous change in output based on the difference-in-Sargan statistic (0.01, p-value = 0.95). We instrument the change in the user cost of R&D with the exogenous parameters of the fiscal incentive scheme, i.e. the length of the first bracket and the second bracket rate, as well as the contemporaneous real R&D deflator in first differences. We use a number of tests to check the validity of our instruments.
The rank test of under-identification rejects the null hypothesis that the matrix of reduced from coefficients has less than full rank and hence points to the relevance of the instruments Column (3) in Table 4 presents the results from equation (13). There is no particular reason to include an individual effect as the equation is already in first-differences and the depreciation of R&D as well as the adjustment speed towards the desired R&D stocks are supposed to be constant across firms. Indeed, when we introduce the individual effects, the individual effects turn out to be insignificant (F-test of the null hypothesis that all individual effects are zero is 0.13, p-value = 0.98).
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The lagged dependent variable, the change in the real user cost of R&D, and the change in output are likely to be correlated with the error term. The Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that the growth rate in the real user cost of R&D, is exogenous (
The lagged dependent variable in (13) is also correlated with the error term because of its MA(1) nature. Therefore, we instrument the change in the user cost and
by the length of the first bracket and the second bracket rate, the contemporaneous real R&D deflator (in first differences), and
. The instruments are significant and valid in this equation, using Sargan test (0.61, p-value = 0.89), the rank test of under-identification (52.8, p-value = 0.00), and Cragg-Donald statistic (10.7), although the Shea partial R 2 for this equation is somewhat smaller, 0.11. The estimated short-run user cost elasticity is -0.42 and the long-run elasticity -0.79, both statistically significant.
Our estimated partial adjustment coefficient of 0.5 is also quite reasonable, indicating that firms accomplish half of their desired capital stock growth in every period. The output elasticity is relatively low and only significant at a 10% level of confidence. The elasticity with respect to the industry price is significant only at 10%. Parameter δ is estimated at 0.1 6 In the model selection process we experimented with several control variables. We included controls for business cycle influences on R&D investment by using industry-specific business cycle indicators: for investment potential (i.e. solvability and return on total assets) and indicators for perceived competition, turbulence and economic development. These variables were constructed and provided to us by EIM. None of these control variables had a significant coefficient. We also tried to control for a possible size effect in the R&D investment rate by including the log of the number of employees as an additional regressor. This size effect would capture, not scale effects but, differences in the speed of adjustment of the R&D stock. This coefficient was also insignificant. To include more firm specific control variables we would have to resort to the CIS surveys, which are only available in even years. We have refrained from doing so in order not to lose too many observations. and is statistically significant. The output price markup and returns to scale coefficients (ζ and ν, resp.) are not reported because they are derived from industry and firm output elasticities which are not statistically significant 7 .
Both short-term and long-term price elasticities are statistically different from zero at the 1% level of significance in all three specifications. We also note that the three models, which differ essentially in the assumed dynamics of R&D stock accumulation, produce consistent results. A 10 percent decrease in the user cost of R&D is predicted by the three models to increase the R&D stock by respectively 2, 5 and 4 percent in the short run and 5.6, 5.4 and 7.9 percent in the long run. The estimated R&D price elasticities reported in the literature vary widely depending on the data, the estimation method and perhaps the underlying tax incentive system (see van Reenen, 2000, Wilson, 2007) . Our estimated R&D price elasticities are in the ballpark of those reported elsewhere. If ever there was a systematic deviation, which would require a proper meta-analysis to control for other differences in the conducted studies, it would be a lower long-run elasticity and a lower spread between short-run and long-run elasticities.
We ran a number of alternative specifications to test the sensitivity of our results. We estimated a finite-distributed lag model similar to one employed for example by Chirinko, are more likely to be credit constrained and therefore more sensitive to tax incentives. As expected, the adjustment speed towards the optimal R&D stock is somewhat higher for large firms (0.58 versus 0.52), although the difference is statistically not significantly different from zero.
Effectiveness of tax credits to R&D
On the basis of the estimated elasticity of R&D with respect to its user cost we can analyze the effectiveness of the tax credits, i.e. find out whether the additional R&D stimulated by the tax incentive policy is greater than the tax expenditures related to this program. We shall be interested in evaluating the effectiveness of the whole fiscal incentives program and not of particular aspects of it 8 .
In the absence of a proper cost-benefit calculation, that would include all direct and indirect costs and benefits related to such a program, the usual way to assess the efficiency of R&D tax incentives consists in computing the so-called "bang for the buck" (BFTB). The BFTB calculates how much private R&D gets generated per Euro of R&D tax receipts foregone. It is greater than 1, R&D tax incentives are considered to be efficient in stimulating additional R&D; a value smaller than 1 means that part of the money received from tax incentives substitutes for private financing
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. What is important, but generally not done in this kind of evaluation, is to compare not just the present but also all future R&D and tax receipts foregone, because if firms adjust their desired R&D stock only gradually, it takes time for the additional R&D expenditures, and the associated costs to the government that go with it, to realize.
To evaluate the entire fiscal incentives program, and not just particular aspects of it, we shall compare the present situation with the scheme in place to a fictive scenario where the government would remove the entire program. In our model based on the user cost of R&D the price elasticity has no longer a direct connection to the BFTB (2002) regress private labor R&D expenditures on WBSO disbursements and obtain a figure, which they interpret as being the BFTB, of 1.01. The advantage of their specification is that it obviates the need to eliminate observations in order to construct an R&D stock. For comparison, in Lokshin and Mohnen (2007a) we have re-estimated their model on a dataset somewhat larger than the one used in this paper, adding a fixed effect, and obtained a coefficient of 1.25. This estimate was also not very different if we increased the sample to the maximum number of available observations instead of the restricted number of observations allowing the construction of an R&D stock. This approach suffers, however, from a simultaneity bias, because not only do the WBSO tax credit rates depend on the amount of R&D performed, but, even more so, the disbursements are directly determined by the amount of R&D performed. It is, therefore, impossible to establish the direction of causality, unless an arbitrary lag between disbursements and R&D expenditures is assumed. 11 Because
12 Given the robustness of the results across specifications, for analytical simplicity we compute the BFTB using the partial adjustment model (10). 
where σλ − is the estimated user cost elasticity of R&D stock in the first period, λ is the estimated partial adjustment coefficient, δ is depreciation parameter for the R&D stock, taken to be 15%, r is the risk-free interest rate, on average 3%, and where the user cost elasticity, common to all firms of a given size class and constant over time, is converted to a marginal effect for period t using the optimal R&D stock and the user cost of R&D of period t.
The discrete change in the user cost when the tax credit is suppressed in period 0,
given by the following expression:
The construction of ) ( i i R G -the fraction of the private R&D supported by the WBSO tax incentive program -is explained in Appendix A. Substituting (17) and (18) into (16) 
, assuming that the factor composition of the R&D costs does not vary with the tax credit rate.
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The BFTB related to the removal of the entire program is given by the ratio of equations (19) and (20): 15 Because of the unbalanced nature of our sample, the reference year 0 is different for every firm. We take it to be the last year a firm is observed in the sample. All parameters that enter the computation of (19) and (20) are taken for that particular year for each firm. 16 The cumulative decrease in R&D up to t years after a removal of the WBSO is given by . explained in appendix B. According to our estimates, the decrease in R&D due to removal of the tax incentives is more than compensated by the decrease in the government tax expenditures. In other words, the introduction of the WBSO would lead eventually to less additional R&D than the WBSO budget devoted to it.
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The effectiveness of the fiscal scheme differs, however, by size class. We distinguish two size classes: the small firms with less than 200 employees and the large firms with at least 200 employees. We re-compute BFTB for the two size classes by using the estimated elasticities for each size class. One year after the removal of the program the BFTB is equal to 3.24 (tstatistic 3.07) for small firms and 0.78 (t-statistic 4.04) for large firms. If we limit the analysis to the immediate business R&D outlays and associated costs to the government, the program seems to be effective in stimulating new R&D for small firms but not for large firms. If we consider the whole sequence of R&D outlays and associated costs to the government, i.e. 15 years after the removal of the program, we conclude that the BFTB drops to 1.21 (t-statistic 0.77) for small firms and to 0.42 (t-statistic 0.17) for large firms. The costs to the government exceed the additional private R&D for the latter group.
The long-term ineffectiveness of a fiscal incentive scheme like the Dutch WBSO reflects the dead-weight loss related to a level-based system of R&D tax incentives 18 . With a level-based R&D fiscal incentive scheme firms can apply for tax deductions regardless of their past R&D effort. The tax credit applies to the total R&D labor bill, i.e. the current incremental R&D and the level of R&D existing before the introduction of the scheme. Supporting pre-existing R&D, which was done anyway, is a dead-weight loss from the social planner's perspective. In contrast, with increment-based R&D tax incentives scheme only the additional R&D would be supported. Conversely, removing the existing scheme, as we have experimented with, would decrease R&D to an extent determined by the user-cost elasticities, but not remove it completely. For government, this measure would decrease not just the expensing related to the decrease in R&D but also the WBSO support of all present R&D. Removing the WBSO would result in regaining the dead-weight loss
19
.
The results of the simulations suggest that for the small firms the hypothesis of crowding out can be rejected and that the fiscal incentives program is successful in stimulating small firms' investment in R&D especially in the short run. For large firms the Dutch R&D support program does not look to be effective. From the beginning the deadweight loss overshadows the increase in R&D generated from the program.
To compute the magnitude of the deadweight loss, we evaluate the WBSO support for the amount of R&D that would be done even in the absence of the program, i.e. in our experiment at the new steady state after complete removal of the WBSO (let's denote the new optimal R&D as
and divide this expression by the difference in revenue loss for the government with and without the fiscal incentives scheme
Expression (22) indicates how much unnecessary WBSO disbursement the government would save by removing the whole WBSO. It corresponds to the subsidizing of the amount of R&D that would be done in the absence of the WBSO. Giving WBSO disbursement on that amount 19 We have also simulated the effects of marginal changes in the parameters entering the WBSO tax scheme by calculating the changes in R&D due to those changes in the tax parameters and comparing it to the related cost savings/increases in revenue losses for the government. In the case of a marginal change the expression for Ri u Δ that enters (16) can be expressed as:
representing the difference in the user cost evaluated at the new and the old tax scheme parameters. The expression (20) for the denominator of BFTB ratio becomes the difference in the costs to the government evaluated at the old and new parameters. While the BFTB curves shift up or down as a result of the marginal changes in parameters, the dead-weight loss remains, as does the shape of the BFTB curve.
is precisely the source of the dead-weight loss. Expression (23) 
Conclusions
In this paper we have assessed the effectiveness of the R&D fiscal incentive program in the Netherlands, which consists in reducing the employer's social security contributions in proportion to the R&D wage bill (known as the WBSO program). Although we used in our simulations specific numeric values characteristic of the support scheme in one country, we believe our conclusions can be generalized to any level-based R&D support scheme, which now gain popularity in Europe.
We estimated dynamic factor-demand models based on a CES production function to measure the responsiveness of a firm's R&D capital accumulation to changes in its user cost due to changes in R&D tax incentives. We have estimated our econometric models on a firm-level sample covering 1996-2004. The richness of the dataset allowed us to construct firm-specific R&D user costs as a function of R&D tax incentives. The results suggest that R&D is responsive to its user cost. We obtain a statistically significant short-run elasticity of the order of 0.2 to 0.5 and a significant long-run elasticity of the order of 0.54 to 0.79. According to our preferred specification the adjustment speed to the new optimal R&D knowledge level is quite high, 90% of the adjustment being completed within 2-3 periods.
To evaluate whether a level-based R&D incentives program is successful we have performed policy experiments in which we simulated the reduction in R&D following the suppression of the fiscal program and changes in specific tax parameters. By calculating the amount of the decrease in R&D in the absence of the tax incentives and comparing it to the decrease in present and future tax expenditures related to the WBSO we have computed the so-called "bang for the buck" (BFTB), given by the ratio of these two amounts. According to our results a level-based tax incentives scheme has the largest impact in the first period after which the effect of the tax incentives declines. Our results suggest that the positive effect of the program is larger for small firms. Our simulations show that after an initial shock the impact of a level-based tax incentives program gradually declines until a new steady state is reached. The BFTB decline is due to the level-based nature of the scheme, meaning that firms can apply for the wage tax deductions for the current year regardless of their past R&D efforts. As a result, the cost to the government of a level-based scheme in our experiment grows faster than the incremental (additional) firm R&D that such a program stimulates. This dead-weight loss is typical for level-based R&D tax incentives and would not occur in incremental R&D tax incentives. If recently various governments seem to steer away from incremental R&D tax incentives, there must be other reasons for it that we have not investigated (e.g. higher administration costs). The deadweight loss is immediately visible for large firms (the bang-for-the-buck being smaller than one from the first period on) and is also significant for small firms. Bringing forward the extent of this invisible deadweight loss associated with a level-based R&D support program, such as WBSO scheme, and similar level-based fiscal R&D support programs elsewhere, is the main message of this paper.
Several other elements would have to be included in a more refined cost-benefit analysis of a tax incentive program. In addition to possible external effects and side effects in the benefits of the tax program, one would also need to consider the administrative and implementation costs for the firms and the government and the opportunity cost of the tax expenditures devoted to the WBSO. These costs are however difficult to measure accurately. A first attempt at such analysis is reported in Mohnen and Lokshin (2010) . Another interesting avenue for future research would be to estimate whether there is a difference in returns for the R&D stimulated by tax incentives and the R&D done in the absence of tax incentives. After all, there are good reasons to believe that the additional R&D would have been done anyway if it yielded a higher return than the R&D done in the absence of tax incentives. In the experiments we also did not take into account a possible price effect of R&D tax incentives.
Some of the government support may get dissipated in higher R&D wages instead of real R&D spending (see Goolsbee, 1998) . If that is the case, the benefit from tax incentives might be overestimated.
And, finally, as already mentioned, it would be certainly be interesting to estimate the effect of tax incentives on the probability to engage in R&D. Bringing firms to become R&D performers is perhaps the major goal of R&D tax incentives, and since these firms did no R&D beforehand, for these firms there is no deadweight loss. Notes: The corporate income tax rate used in the construction of the user cost has decreased on average for the sampled firms from 36% to 29% between 1997 and 2004. B-index (column 3) is calculated using expression (A4) in Appendix A; WBSO tax credit (column 2) is calculated using the expression in square brackets (times wage share) of A4. Column (4) is a product of column (1) and column (3). Column (5) is the product of column (1) and the sum of column (3) and column (2). Notes: Estimation period is 1996-2004. *** indicates significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. Standard errors of the long-run elasticities are computed using the delta method.
Appendix A: Measurement of the user cost of R&D in the Netherlands
The user cost of R&D measures how much it costs a firm to hold a unit of R&D stock of knowledge. It corresponds to the price for this unit of knowledge if there was a rental market for knowledge. It can be derived from the equality between the discounted value of the net (after income tax) "rental" cost of a unit of R&D and the net (of tax incentives) purchase price of that same unit. Deleting the time subscript to ease notation, we can write the user cost of R&D for firm i as (1983), is defined as the ratio of the net cost of a euro spent on R&D, after all quantifiable tax incentives have been accounted for, to the net income from one euro of revenue. If, for instance, a firm spends one euro on R&D and can expense it, and the corporate tax rate is 50%, then one euro of R&D costs effectively 50 eurocent, hence one euro of return before tax is equivalent to 50 eurocent after tax. The B-index in this case is equal to 1.
Given the R&D tax incentive structure in the Netherlands, the B-index looks as follows:
We denote the fraction of the private R&D supported by the WBSO tax incentive program for firm i by 20 The R&D deflator is constructed as the average of the GDP deflator and the R&D wage index as suggested by Jaffe and Griliches (see Bureau of Labor Statistics (1989) ). 21 The interest rate in the user cost of R&D expression could be corrected for risk. The returns from riskier projects would be discounted more. However, in practice it is difficult to measure this risk factor. Since the risk element is probably case specific, it will be partially eliminated in panel data by correcting for an individual effect.
22 The R&D depreciation rate is assumed to be equal to 15%. We also experimented with rates ranging from 10% to 25%. 25% corresponds to a depreciation rate consistent with patent decays (see Pakes and Schankerman (1984) ). These changes do not lead to statistically different outcomes in our models. Insensitivity of R&D rates of return to assumed R&D depreciation rates are also reported by Hall and Mairesse (1995) . The term in curly brackets in (A2) reads as follows. In the presence of R&D tax incentives it costs less than 1 € to purchase the equivalent of one € of R&D knowledge. The 1 corresponds to the one € of expenditures in R&D. Get deducted from this one € various fractions that correspond respectively to WBSO deductions from labor taxes, building and equipment amortizations, labor and other current costs expensing. Let us examine these expressions one by one.
The second term in square brackets corresponds to the WBSO. To the extent that R&D is labor cost, and depending on the amount of R&D that is performed, and on whether the "starters facility regulation" can be invoked, a percentage of the R&D labor costs can be deducted from social security where π is the inflation rate in the R&D deflator and T is the finite lifetime of the capital item under straight-line depreciation. The interest rate in the user cost of R&D expression can be tax deductible if the R&D is financed by borrowed funds. But most R&D is financed by retained earnings and the opportunity cost from retained earnings is not tax deductible. In any case information on the source of finance (retained earnings versus borrowings from banks or issuing shares) is only available at the company level and not at the business unit level at which we are working. It could be argued that what matters for a marginal investment for firms above the first WBSO ceiling is the second bracket WBSO rate. Any increase in the first bracket rate would be considered as windfall profit and not affect the marginal R&D decision: we believe that it makes sense to consider that this windfall profit gets reinvested in R&D. If, however, we assumed that only the marginal WBSO rates matter, then the B-index would be: 
, i.e. R&D labor costs are below the first bracket ceiling. Given the R&D tax incentives structure in the Netherlands, we used expression (A2) to construct the B-index contained in the user cost measure. This expression is a weighted average of the first and second bracket rates. According to this expression, a firm that is situated in the second bracket but below the ceiling would receive a wind-fall profit if the rate of the first bracket or the length of the first bracket was extended, even if all other parameters remained unchanged. Such changes occurred several times during 1996-2004, the period covered in our panel (see table 2). One of the premises of economic theory is that economic agents take decisions at the margin. Therefore, one could argue that firms decide on their marginal R&D investments on the basis of the marginal WBSO rates, hence for firms that are in the second bracket it would be that rate and only that rate which matters. This would mean that the wind-fall profits would not affect firms' R&D decisions. If we assume that only the marginal WBSO rates matter, then we would use the expression for the B-index given by formula (A3). In this case the constructed user cost is higher and the effective tax credit part is lower. The estimated short-run elasticity decreases to 0.13 and the long-run elasticity to 0.25. It has, however, been argued in the capital investment literature that liquidity can affect firms' capital investment decisions (Fazzari et al., 1988) . Liquidity effects may be even more important for investment decisions in non-tangible assets like R&D, which are relatively more risky than investment in physical capital. Hall (1992) , Hao and Jaffe (1993) , Harhoff (1998) , Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) provide empirical evidence that liquidity has an effect on firms' R&D investment. Therefore we argue that firms decide on their R&D investment based on the average user cost of R&D (expression A4), so that firms in the second bracket would increase their R&D even if the rate of the first WBSO bracket increases, providing them with more liquidity. De Jong and Verhoeven (2007) 
